ABSTRACT Millimeter-wave (mmWave) communication is the rising technology for simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-based relay networks for the abundant bandwidth and short wavelength. However, the secrecy performance of mmWave SWIPT UAV-based relay systems has not been investigated so far. In this paper, we consider secure transmissions of mmWave SWIPT UAV-based relay systems in the presence of multiple independent homogeneous Poisson point process (HPPP) eavesdroppers. Different from most existing works considering a free-space path loss model, the air-to-ground channels are modeled as Nakagami-m small-scale fading, and the effects of blockage to mmWave links on the ground and the 3D antenna gain model are considered. The closed-form expressions of the average achievable secrecy rate and energy coverage probability for amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF) relay protocols under power splitting (PS) SWIPT policy are derived to reveal the impact of various parameters on system performance. The simulation results show that there is the optimal UAV position to maximize the secrecy rate and the optimal position is closer to the node whose transmit power is relatively small. Furthermore, different carrier frequencies are suitable for different eavesdropping node density.
wireless channels, security is one of the key concerns in wireless communications. Spoofing, jamming and eavesdropping attacks are three main physical layer attacks in wireless networks [5] , [6] , and we focus on eavesdropping attack in this paper. Physical layer security (PLS) technique, which exploits randomness of wireless medium to protect information transmission against eavesdropping, has been identified as a promising way to realize secrecy in wireless communication [7] , [8] . Some potential application scenarios and challenges for physical layer security and wireless energy harvesting are presented in [9] . In this paper, we investigate the PLS performance of mmWave SWIPT UAV-based relay networks.
A. RELATED WORKS AND MOTIVATION
UAV-enabled relay networks in which UAV helps information transmission between far-apart or obstructed ground terminals without reliable direct communication links have attracted great attention recently. The existing literatures about UAV-enabled relay networks are mainly divided into three categories: review [10] , performance analysis [11] , [12] , and optimization [13] - [17] . In [10] , the UAV-assisted heterogeneous cellular where UAV acted as flight relay (FR) to deploy FR cells inside the macrocell was proposed to achieve dynamic and adaptive coverage. The achievable rate of a UAV-relayed cooperative cognitive radio MIMO system was investigated in [11] . In [12] , the coverage probability of UAV-based relay network in disaster recovery was analyzed. In [13] , the optimum altitude of UAV relaying for maximum reliability was investigated. [14] studied the joint trajectory design and power control of UAV relay networks to minimize the outage probability. Reference [15] proposed an iterative optimization algorithm to maximize the throughout for UAV-enabled mobile relaying systems. Reference [16] developed an iterative algorithm to optimize the transmit power of the source and the relay for maximizing the secrecy rate of a UAV-enabled relaying system. An algorithm was developed to optimize the ergodic transmission rate of the ground-to-relay links by controlling the UAV heading angle [17] . The above work studied the performance and optimization of UAV relay systems in different application scenarios. But they are all considered in microwave band which is not applicable to the communications with high data rate requirements due to the scarcity of available spectrum resources in this band.
Recently, mmWave communication was considered to support high data rate urgent of UAV networks since large available bandwidth can be used in the mmWave frequency band. The challenges and solutions of mmWave UAV cellular networks were considered in [2] . Reference [18] proposed a new flight control system based channel tracking method for a UAV mmWave MIMO communication system. Reference [3] analyzed the secrecy performance of downlink mmWave UAVs networks where UAVs served as aerial BSs. The outage probabilities and sum rates of non-orthogonal multiple access mmWave UAV-BSs system were derived rigorously in [19] .
In [20] , UAV was used to monitor the affected area in order to assist the realization of the mmWave public safety communication networks during a wildfire scenario. MmWave UAVs were considered to serve as aerial BSs in the above work. However, adopting UAV relays can extend the coverage and increase the network capacity, and the research on the mmWave UAV relay networks is still in its infancy.
On the other hand, compared with terrestrial microwave communication systems, SWIPT in mmWave UAV-based relay networks has many advantages such as significant array gains, large available bandwidth and strong LOS link of air-ground channel. Inspired by the above work on UAV communications, this paper introduces mmWave and SWIPT into the UAV relay system to realize simultaneous information and power transmission for the energy constrained IoT device. Moreover, security is one of the key concerns for mmWave SWIPT UAV-based relay systems whether civil or military since an enormous amount of sensitive and confidential information may be intercepted by non-intended receivers. Therefore, the security performance in the mmWave SWIPT UAV-based relay networks is very worthy of attention. Prior works focused on the physical layer security (PLS) of UAV-based relay networks in sub-6G band [16] or UAV-based BS networks in mmWave band [3] . But the secrecy performance of mmWave SWIPT UAV-based relay systems has not been investigated in the literatures. The effects of UAV-based mmWave relay channel, 3D antenna gain and the blockage on the ground on system performance are worthy of consideration.
B. APPROACH AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of mmwave SWIPT UAV-based relay system in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers on the ground. The main contributions are summarized as follows.
• Different from most existing works considering a free-space path loss model, the air-to-ground channels are modeled as Nakagami-m small scale fading, and the effects of blockage to mmwave links on the ground and the 3D antenna gain model are considered. Using a stochastic geometry framework, the locations of the multiple eavesdroppers are modeled as independent homogeneous Poisson point process (HPPP) on the ground. We consider power splitting (PS) policy, i.e., the energy constrained destination uses a portion of the received power from the UAV relay for energy harvesting and the remaining power for information processing.
• The closed-form expressions of the average achievable secrecy rate and energy coverage probability under AF and DF protocols are derived to reveal the impact of various parameters, e.g. power splitting ratio, transmit power, UAV's location, carrier frequency, etc., on system performance. Simulation results validate the accuracy of the theoretical analysis and demonstrate the impact of different system parameters on the energy coverage probability and achievable secrecy rate.
• The numerical and simulation results show that the closer the UAV is to the destination, the larger the energy coverage probability will be when other parameters are fixed. Besides, there is the optimal UAV position to maximize the secrecy rate. And the optimal position is closer to the node whose transmit power is relatively small. In addition, the power setting resulting in the maximum achievable rate of the destination may not achieve the best secrecy rate. And it is not that the larger the transmit power, the larger the secrecy rate. Furthermore, when the eavesdropping node density is small, the average secrecy rate at 28GHz outperforms that of 73GHz. Otherwise, 73GHz performs better. And we should choose proper relay protocols for different link quality. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model, including the network model, channel and antenna models employed. In section III and IV, we analyze the average achievable secrecy rate and energy coverage probability under AF and DF protocols, respectively. Section V gives numerical simulations to verify the analysis. Finally, our work is concluded in section VI. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. NETWORK MODEL
We consider a mmWave UAV communications system, consisting of a source, an energy-constrained destination, a UAV-enabled relay and multiple eavesdroppers 1 , as shown in Fig. 1 . We assume that there is no direct link from the source to energy-constrained destination since mmWave signals are particularly sensitive to severe blockages on the ground. So we consider the UAV working as a relay to establish air-to-ground links to assist the communication from the source to destination. The UAV-based relay operates in time division duplex (TDD) manner. The source transmits signals to UAV in the first time slot, and UAV forwards the processed signal to destination in the second time slot. Both amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-andforward (DF) relaying protocols are considered 2 . The eavesdropping nodes are randomly distributed following HPPP φ e with density λ E on the ground. The locations of the source, destination and UAV relay in a 3D Cartesian coordinate system are (0, 0, 0), (D, 0, 0), and (x 0 , y 0 , H ), respectively. We consider power splitting (PS) policy [21] , i.e., the destination uses a portion of the received power from the UAV relay for energy harvesting and the remaining power for information processing. The direct and relay branches at eavesdroppers are combined by the selection combining (SC) scheme. And we consider the worst case that all the received RF signals by the eavesdroppers are used for information processing.
B. CHANNEL AND ANTENNA MODEL
We assume the air-to-ground channels are dominated by LOS links, and the terrestrial signal path can be LOS or nonline-of-sight (NLOS) due to blockage effects. The blockage model in [22] is adopted, i.e., if a link of length r is less than the maximum LOS distance R, the LOS probability is p L , otherwise, the LOS probability is 0. MmWave behaves totally different propagation characteristics for the LOS and NLOS links [23] , [24] . The path loss L(d ae ) = c s d
) 2 is the frequency dependent constant parameter, f c is the carrier frequency, c = 3 × 10 8 m/s; α L (α N ) is the path loss exponent for the LOS(NLOS) link; d ij represents the distance between node i and j, where i, j ∈ {a, r, b, e}, a, r, b, and e represent the source (Alice), UAV relay, destination (Bob) and eavesdropper, respectively. And we assume independent Nakagami-m small-scale fading for each link [23] . Specifically, for a LOS link, the small-scale fading power between node i and j follows normalized Gamma random variable, i.e.,
Note that UAV's frame and antenna type also affect the quality of the signal transmission [25] , but this is beyond our work.
Directional beamforming antenna arrays are deployed at all nodes to compensate the high path loss of the mmWave system. We use the 3D sectorized antenna gain model to approximate the antenna gain pattern of all nodes [3] , [26] . Specifically, G i,j denotes the total directivity gain between node i and j,
represents the main-lobe gain (side-lobe gain) at node i with probability P [3] , [26] . We assume perfect beam alignment for the desired link between the UAV relay and source (destination), and this assumption has been used in many recent works [22] - [24] , so
III. AF PROTOCOL
In this section, we consider the secrecy performance for AF protocol under PS policy, where the UAV relay amplifies the received signal and forwards the signal to the destination. And the typical user uses a fraction w of the received power for information processing and the remaining 1 − w for energy harvesting, where 0 < w < 1. In particular, we analyze the average achievable secrecy rate and energy coverage probability.
A. INFORMATION AND ENERGY TRANSMISSION
In the first time slot, the source transmits signals to UAV relay, the received signal at UAV relay and any eavesdropper can be expressed as follows:
where P s is the transmit power at the source, x is the normalized information signal of the source, H ij is the fading gain from node i to node j, specifically,
, where i, j ∈ {a, r, b, e}; n r and n e is the AWGN at UAV relay and any eavesdropper, n r ∼CN (0, σ 2 r ), n e ∼CN (0, σ 2 e ). In the second time slot, UAV relay uses the AF protocol for relaying y r to the destination, and the amplifying coefficient
The signal received at the destination and any eavesdropper can be formulated as [27] :
and
where P r is the transmit power at the UAV relay, n b is the AWGN at the destination, and n b ∼CN (0, σ 2 b ). The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the destination can be written as [27] 
The direct and relay branches at the eavesdroppers are combined by using the selection combining scheme.
Then SINR at the most malicious eavesdropper can be written as [27] γ e * = max
where
B. AVERAGE ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
The secrecy rate which is defined as R s = 
Proof: Based on the fact that E{max(x, y)} ≥ max(E{x}, E{y}), we get
Since perfect beam alignment for the desired link between the UAV relay and the source (destination) can be achieved and the eavesdroppers only intercept the confidential information passively, the fading gain of the primary link is usually greater than the eavesdropping link. So E{R s } can be approximated as R s . Next we use R s to represent the average achievable secrecy rate. To calculate the average achievable secrecy rate, we derive the average rate R b and R E , respectively, by the following theorems.
Theorem 1: The exact average rate between the source and destination node of AF protocol is given by
with
Proof: See Appendix A. From (9)- (11) of Theorem 1 we can see that the average rate between the source and destination node is affected by the power splitting ratio, the transmit power, antenna gain, UAV position, etc. Specially, the average rate gradually increases with the increasing of the power splitting ratio. And there is optimal UAV location to achieve a better rate and the optimal position is related to the power splitting ratio and transmit power.
Theorem 2: The exact average rate between the source and the most malicious eavesdropper of AF protocol is given by
where 1 (γ ) and 2 (γ ) are given by (13) and (14), shown at the bottom of the next page,
, L e denotes the maximum connection distance between UAV relay and eavesdropper, L e = H / tan(θ e d /2), and d 0 is the minimum link distance.
Proof: See Appendix B.
From (12)- (14) of Theorem 2 we can see that the R E is affected by the eavesdropper density, antenna array deployment, transmit power, etc. And the rate increases with the increasing of the eavesdropper density.
Remark 1: From (9)- (14) of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we can derive the secrecy rate of AF protocol according to Proposition 1. And we can see that the power splitting ratio only affects the rate of the destination and the eavesdropper density only affects the rate of the most aggressive eavesdropper. So the secrecy rate can be greatly improved in the case of large power splitting ratio and low eavesdropper density. But the achievable rates of the destination and the most aggressive eavesdropper are all related to the transmit power. Therefore, the power setting resulting in the maximum achievable rate of the destination may not achieve the best secrecy rate. And it is not that the larger the transmit power, the larger the secrecy rate.
C. ENERGY COVERAGE PROBABILITY
In this part, to evaluate the energy harvesting performance, we define the energy coverage probability as P ec = Pr{P ener > ψ}, where P ener is the effective harvested power, ψ is the energy outage threshold.
Theorem 3: The energy coverage probability is given by
where η ∈ (0, 1] is the energy conversion efficiency.
Proof: According to (3), the effective energy harvested at the destination in unit time can be written as (16) According to the definition of energy coverage probability and the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of h rb , we derive
Remark 2: From Theorem 3, we can see that the energy coverage probability decreases with the increasing of power splitting ratio and energy outage threshold, respectively. And it has nothing to do with the transmit power at the source.
IV. DF PROTOCOL
In this section, we consider the secrecy performance for DF protocol, where the UAV relay decodes the received signal and forwards the signal to the destination. Similar to AF protocol, we analyze the average achievable secrecy rate and energy coverage probability.
A. INFORMATION AND ENERGY TRANSMISSION
For DF protocol, the SINR at the destination and the most malicious eavesdropper can be written as [27] 
B. AVERAGE ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE Similar to AF protocol, to get R s , we need to derive R b and R E , respectively, by the following theorems.
Theorem 4:
The exact average rate between the source and destination node of DF protocol is given by (20) , shown at the bottom of the next page, where u(n) represents the unit step sequence, i.e., when n ≥ 0, u(n) = 1, otherwise u(n) = 0.
Proof: See Appendix A. From (20) of Theorem 4 we can see that, similar to AF protocol, the average rate between the source and destination node is affected by the power splitting ratio, the transmit power, antenna gain, UAV position, etc. In general, the destination's rate of DF protocol is larger than that of AF protocol. But when the performance gap between two hops is large, the destination's rate of AF protocol is approaching that of DF protocol.
Theorem 5: The exact average rate between the source and the most malicious eavesdropper of DF protocol can be written as
where W (γ ) is given by (22) , shown at the bottom of the next page.
Proof: See Appendix B. Similar to AF protocol, the R E is affected by the eavesdropper density, antenna array deployment, transmit power, etc. When the performance of the UAV-eavesdropper link is particularly worse than the source-UAV link, the R E of AF protocol is approaching that of DF protocol.
Remark 3: From (20)- (22) of Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, we can derive the secrecy rate of DF protocol according to Proposition 1. We note that the secrecy rate of DF protocol is larger than that of AF protocol in most cases. But when the performance of the source-UAV link is particularly worse, the secrecy rate of AF protocol is larger than that of DF protocol. That is because the destination's rates of AF and DF protocols are almost the same and the eavesdropper's rate of AF protocol is smaller than that of DF protocol. Therefore, we should choose proper relay protocols for different network environments.
C. ENERGY COVERAGE PROBABILITY
For DF protocol, the effective harvested power P ener = η(1− w)h rb L(d rb )P r G rb , which is equals to (16) . So the energy coverage probability of DF protocol is the same as that of AF protocol. The expression of the energy coverage probability of DF protocol is given by (15) of Theorem 3.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we investigate the secrecy performance of the mmWave SWIPT UAV-based relay network. Some representative simulation results are provided to illustrate the impact of different system parameters on the average achievable secrecy rate and energy coverage probability under both AF and DF protocols. Monte Carlo simulations are conducted to verify analytical results, and the simulation parameters are shown in Table 1 . We consider the UPA is used at all nodes 3 , and the main-lobe beamwidths, main-lobe and side-lobe gains of an N element ( Table 2 . The source, UAV relay, destination, and eavesdroppers are equipped with N a , N r , N b and N e antennas, respectively, and we set N a = N r = N b = N e = N without loss of generality. Fig. 2 plots the energy coverage probability versus the power splitting ratio w with different UAV location, transmit power and energy outage threshold. Obviously, the energy 3 UPA can bring higher antenna gain compared with uniform linear array (ULA) since more antennas can be packed in the same limited space.
v n y n y n (L e − y n ) coverage probability decreases with increasing of w. We first observe that the closer the UAV is to the destination, the larger the energy coverage probability is when the transmit power, power splitting ratio and energy outage threshold are fixed. That is because the energy harvested at the destination is determined by the link quality between UAV and the destination. And we can also see that the energy coverage probability is greatly reduced when energy outage threshold is increased. Fig. 3 presents the average secrecy rate versus λ E . We use the carrier frequencies at 28GHz and 73GHz. It is first observed from these curves that the average secrecy rate decreases with the increasing of λ E . Furthermore, when the eavesdropping node density is small, the average secrecy rate at 28GHz outperforms that of 73GHz. But the average secrecy rate at 73GHz performs better under high eavesdropping node density. This can be explained by the fact that the low frequency mmWave signals experience lower path loss, which results in larger legitimate link rate and eavesdropping link rate at the same time. Under low eavesdropping node density, legitimate link rate improvement is larger than eavesdropping link rate increase at low frequency, which results in larger secrecy rate at low frequency. But under high eavesdropping node density, eavesdropping link rate improvement is larger than legitimate link rate increase at low frequency, which results in lower secrecy rate at low frequency. Fig. 4 presents the average achievable secrecy rate versus the power splitting ratio w under AF and DF protocols with different UAV location. We can see that the secrecy rate gradually increases with increasing of w. This can be explained by the fact that the rate of the destination increases with increasing of w but the rate of the eavesdropper has nothing to do with w. The UAV location to achieve a better secrecy rate is changed as w increases. When w is small, the UAV should be closer to the destination to achieve a better secrecy rate. But when w is large, the UAV should be in the middle of the source and destination. That is because the closer position to the destination resulting in smaller path loss can compensate for the destination's rate reduction due to small w. Fig. 5 presents the achievable rate of the destination and the average secrecy rate versus a under AF and DF protocols with different transmit power and UAV location, and we set x 0 = aD. We first find that there is the optimal UAV position to maximize the rate. And the optimal position is closer to the node whose transmit power is relatively small. That is because the smaller path loss due to closer position can compensate for the power reduction. Second, the destination's rate of DF protocol is larger than that of AF protocol in most cases. But when the performance gap between two hops is large, the destination's rate of AF protocol is approaching that of DF protocol. Third, the secrecy rate of DF protocol is larger than that of AF protocol in most cases. But when the performance of the source-UAV link is particularly worse, the secrecy rate of AF protocol is larger than that of DF protocol. That is because the destination's rates of AF and DF protocols are almost the same but the eavesdropper's rate of AF protocol is smaller than that of DF protocol. Moreover, the power setting resulting in the maximum achievable rate of the destination may not achieve the best secrecy rate. And it is not that the larger the transmit power, the larger the secrecy rate. Fig. 6 shows the average achievable rate versus P t under AF and DF protocols, where P t = P s = P r . We can see that the achievable rates of the destination and the most aggressive eavesdropper improve dramatically as the transmit power increases. But the average secrecy rate increases and saturates to a constant value. That is because when P t is small, the rate improvement of the destination from increasing P t is the dominant factor to increase the secrecy rate. But when P t is large, the rates are mainly determined by the transmit power, so the rate gap between the destination and the most aggressive eavesdropper tends to be steady. Fig. 7 shows the average achievable rate versus the number of antennas at all nodes under AF and DF protocols. We can 35858 VOLUME 7, 2019 see that the achievable rate of the most aggressive eavesdropper increases and saturates to a constant value as the number of antennas increases. That is because the increasing N results in higher main-lobe gain and narrower main-lobe beamwidth at the same time. When N is relatively small, the increasing main-lobe gain is the dominant factor to increase the rate. But when N is large, the increased main-lobe gain and the reduced information leakage probability will reach a balance. Furthermore, we observe that the achievable rates of the destination and the average secrecy rate improve dramatically as the number of antennas increases. This can be explained by the fact that the higher antenna gain from increasing N can improve the destination's rate and the secrecy rate is mainly determined by the rate of the destination. In Fig. 8 , we compare the average achievable secrecy rate
} of our scheme with that of UAV-based relay networks in sub-6G band [16] . We set f c = 73GHz, BW = 1GHz for mmWave system, and f c = 2GHz, BW = 20MHz for sub-6GHz networks. We can see that the secrecy rate of mmWave networks is much larger than that of sub-6GHz networks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the secrecy communication in mmwave SWIPT UAV-enabled relay system. We considered two relay protocols, i.e., AF and DF. The closed-form expressions of the average achievable secrecy rate and energy coverage probability under AF and DF protocols were derived to reveal the impact of various parameters on system performance. Simulation results show that the closer the UAV is to the destination, the larger the energy coverage probability will be when other parameters are fixed. Besides, there is the optimal UAV position to maximize the secrecy rate. And the optimal position is closer to the node whose transmit power is relatively small. Moreover, it is not that the larger the transmit power, the larger the secrecy rate. Furthermore, when the eavesdropping node density is small, the average secrecy rate at 28GHz outperforms that of 73GHz. Otherwise, 73GHz performs better. When the performance of the source-UAV link is particularly worse, the secrecy rate of AF protocol is larger than that of DF protocol. Otherwise, the secrecy rate of DF protocol is larger. Therefore, we should choose proper relay protocols for different network environments. The eavesdroppers of this paper are on the ground, investigating secure transmissions in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers distributed in three dimensions is worth pursuing. In addition, to solve the coverage problem in hot spots, multiple UAVs worked as a collaborative swarm and 3D placement of the UAVs in this scenario would be an interesting future research direction.
APPENDIX A
The average rate between the source and destination node is calculated as
1+γ dγ , so next we try to get F γ b .
Lemma 1:
, the PDF and CDF of h i can be written as
Step (a) is from [29, eq. (3.478.4) ]. Let Pr{ m 2 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 ) . (5) and (23), F γ b can be written as
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APPENDIX B
To get R E , we first need to derive F γ e * (γ ). According to the definition of γ e * , we derive
Pr{γ re < γ } (25)
Pr{γ ae < γ }], the links between between the source and the eavesdroppers can be LOS and NLOS, let φ L e and φ N e be the PPP of LOS eavesdroppers and NLOS eavesdroppers to the source node, respectively. So 1 (γ ) can be rewritten as
By applying the probability generating functional of the PPP [30] , we can get (27) with
Step (a) is from the CCDF of h ae , step (b) is from [29, eq. (3.381.9) ]. Similarly, we can obtain
Substituting (27)- (30) into (26), we obtain (13 
where d
According to (32) and Gauss-Chebyshev Integration [31] , we can obtain
where . Substituting (32)-(33) into (31), we can obtain (14) .
APPENDIX C
Similar to AF protocol, we first need to get F γ b . According to (18) , F γ b can be written as
According to (34),R b can be written as
Step (a) is from [29, eq. (3.353.5) ], where u(n) represents the unit step sequence, i.e., when n ≥ 0, u(n) = 1, otherwise u(n) = 0.
APPENDIX D
To get R E , we first need to derive F γ e * (γ ) = 
Step (a) is from [29, eq. (3.381.9) ]. According to (13) and (36), (21) 
